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Abstract 
Using a novel cross-country measure of leisure preference to quantify managerial effort aversion, 
we examine its relation to corporate tax avoidance, and document a negative association between 
the two. The result is stronger for firms located in countries with a more complex tax system, and 
for firms with less access to tax consulting services — situations in which corporate tax planning 
can be especially onerous. Finally, tax planning appears to be one mechanism mediating the 
negative relation between leisure preference and firm value, implying that effort aversion is a 
source of agency costs that impedes value-enhancing tax planning activities. 
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He that loveth pleasure shall be a poor man; he that loveth wine and oil shall not be rich. 
  
— King James Bible, Proverbs 21:17 
 
Agency problems afflict all corporations. These problems could originate from multiple sources 
and take various forms. In the context of corporate tax planning, two sources of agency problems 
have been commonly identified and studied. One agency view links tax planning to managerial 
rent extraction. In particular, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) argue that corporate tax planning could 
create opaqueness, which facilitates managerial resource diversion. The other agency view treats 
tax planning as a risky investment that could involve large uncertainties and impose significant 
risk on both firms and managers. Rego and Wilson (2012) suggest that equity risk incentives need 
to be in place to induce risk-averse managers to undertake risky tax planning. Both views are, 
nevertheless, subsequently challenged. Specifically, there is evidence that corporate tax planning 
is not related to opaqueness, but instead is negatively related to fraud risk (Lennox, Lisowsky, and 
Pittman (2013)), and positively associated with internal information quality (Gallemore and Labro 
(2015)). Evidence is also mixed on whether corporate tax avoidance increases both firm risk 
(Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2017), Guenther, Matsunaga, and Williams (2017)) and risk of 
forced CEO turnover (Gallemore, Maydew, and Thornock (2014), Chyz and Gaertner (2018)). 
In this paper, we introduce a third agency perspective on corporate tax planning. We regard 
corporate tax planning as a task that, while having the potential of enhancing firm value, demands 
considerable effort, diligence, commitment, and initiative from managers. This agency view, 
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though largely neglected in the tax planning literature, is consistent with the assertion in the 
seminal Jensen and Meckling (1976) that managerial effort aversion could well be the foremost 
source of agency conflict. Specifically, they postulate:  
“[I]t is likely that the most important conflict arises from the fact that as the manager’s 
ownership falls, his incentive to devote significant effort to creative activities such as 
searching out new profitable ventures falls. He may in fact avoid such ventures simply 
because it requires too much trouble or effort on his part to manage or to learn about new 
technologies. Avoidance of these personal costs and the anxieties that go with them also 
represent a source of on-the-job utility to him and it can result in the value of the firm being 
substantially lower than it otherwise could be.” 
Such a view also resonates with the claim of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) that managers 
may prefer living a quiet life to building a large empire. These authors find that, after managers 
are insulated from corporate takeovers, there is a reduction in the destruction of old plants as well 
as the creation of new plants, both of which are effort- and time-consuming activities.  
In a similar spirit of these two ground-breaking works, our paper examines how managerial 
effort aversion affects corporate tax avoidance. There are several reasons why tax avoidance 
activities can be onerous and personally costly. First, identifying tax avoidance opportunities 
requires a thorough understanding of firm operations as well as sophisticated knowledge of tax 
laws. Second, implementing tax planning strategies (e.g., transfer pricing schemes) often involves 
inter-segment, even cross-country, negotiation and coordination, which entails significant 
transaction costs. Third, corporate tax planning requires meticulous efforts to secure tax savings 
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against the tax authority. All these costs and complexities could make effort-averse managers 
reluctant to undertake value-enhancing tax planning activities.1 
The possibility of underinvestment in corporate tax planning has already raised concerns in the 
business community. For instance, a number of prominent activist hedge funds voiced their 
discontent with slacks and inefficiencies in corporate tax planning, and explicitly requested 
managers to more vigorously pursue value-maximizing tax strategies (Cheng, Huang, Li, and 
Stanfield (2012)). A notable example can be found in the Schedule 13-D/A filing of a high-profile 
hedge fund activist, Third Point, who complained about the CEO of its target company, PDL 
BioPharma.2 
“Mr. McDade lacks the ability to communicate with the investment community effectively in 
part because he has a poor understanding of even basic financial concepts - another major 
concern we have communicated to the PDL Board many times. As we have discussed, he was 
puzzled when we discussed the concept of internal rate of return (IRR) analyses on research 
and development projects, and indeed called us back to ask what we meant by this. He readily 
admitted to us that he has not properly thought through nor effectively utilized PDL's tax 
credits, which has and will result in reduced value for PDL shareholders. (We do not mean 
to suggest that PDL’s CEO must be a tax expert - all we expect is that he or she take 
                                                 
1 It is important to note that we use managerial effort aversion to refer to distaste of effort among not only top 
executives, but also lower-level managers (and employees) who are directly involved in tax planning activities.  
2  The full text of the filing is available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/882104/0000899140-07-
001301.txt. 
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ownership of the issue and develop a plan with the appropriate experts rather than 
ignoring an important and readily exploitable Company asset.)” [Emphasis added] 
The preceding discussions suggest a plausible and important conceptual link between effort 
aversion and corporate tax planning. Our next step is to test this new agency view of tax planning 
empirically. One fundamental challenge in testing the agency view of corporate tax planning is 
quantification of agency cost (Shackelford and Shevlin (2001)). The particular form of agency 
conflict in our research context is managerial effort aversion, which is elusive and difficult to 
measure. In this paper, we employ an innovative approach to quantifying effort aversion by 
exploiting the cross-country variation in leisure preference. Our data source is the World Values 
Survey (WVS), which conducted six waves of large-scale global surveys on a number of cultural 
values and beliefs (including attitudes toward leisure) from 1981 to 2014.3 This leisure attitude 
metric has several desirable properties in capturing managerial aversion to effort. First, several 
economic models (Voss (1967), Killingsworth (1993)) characterize the representative agent as 
facing a work-leisure tradeoff, in which the opportunity cost of work is the forgone benefit of 
leisure.4 Second, the six waves of surveys provide time-variant measures of attitudes toward work 
versus leisure, which enable us to include country fixed effects to purge time-invariant country-
specific factors and better identify the economic effects of leisure preference.5 Finally, the work-
                                                 
3 While the survey subjects are not restricted to managers, executives should share common civic attitudes with the 
general population in the same country (Dyreng, Mayew, and Williams (2012)). 
4 The labor-leisure tradeoff is also widely discussed in literature in sociology. See, for example, an extensive literature 
review in Haworth and Veal (2004).  
5 In earlier economic models, leisure preference is often treated as a constant term. Recent research starts to place a 
greater emphasis on the “time-varying” components of cultural attitudes, because it is increasingly recognized that 
many cultural values and beliefs (including attitudes toward work and leisure) have changed substantially over time 
in response to changes in economic conditions, technologies, and institutions (e.g., Giavazzi, Schiantarelli, and 
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leisure tradeoff is plausibly relevant in the context of corporate tax planning. A stronger leisure 
preference indicates that a greater weight is assigned to leisure over work, making corporate tax 
planning marginally more costly and thus more undesirable to firm executives. 
After we impose a few data requirements, our final sample comprises 186,870 firm-year 
observations from 41 countries and covers a period from 1992 to 2013. Our baseline results show 
a strong, negative association between corporate tax planning intensity and leisure preference. 
This suggests that firms engage less in corporate tax planning in countries with a stronger leisure 
preference. The effect of leisure preference on tax planning is also economically significant. 
Moving from the 25th percentile of leisure preference to its 75th percentile increases tax payments 
by 6.52% of pre-tax earnings. This finding is robust to alternative measures of leisure preference, 
alternative samples, and a variety of alternative explanations. In an additional analysis, we use 
worldwide work time reforms as staggered shocks to leisure preference to examine the marginal 
effect of leisure preference on tax planning. We find that firms engage less in tax planning after 
a country implements a work time reform that advances leisure time. The effect is asymmetric, 
though. There is no evidence that firms engage more in tax planning after a work time reform 
that shortens leisure time.  
Next, we identify two situations in which corporate tax planning can be particularly arduous to 
managers. The first scenario is the existence of a complicated country-level tax system. When a 
                                                 
Serafinelli (2009)). Elgin and Yucel (2014) find large cross-country and time-series variations in leisure preference, 
which renders the assumption of a constant leisure preference in economic modeling inappropriate. Several important 
international surveys of cultural values also indicate significant intertemporal shifts in attitudes toward work and 
leisure. 
  
6 
 
country has a labyrinthine tax system, engagement in tax planning requires greater efforts, and 
shirking of effort-averse managers could then be exacerbated.6 We use the World Bank data on 
time to prepare and pay taxes to measure home country tax system complexity. The second 
situation is limited access to external tax consulting services, proxied by the number of country-
level tax consulting firms. Tax planning naturally demands more managerial effort when external 
assistance is scarcer. Consistent with our predictions, we find that the negative relation between 
leisure preference and corporate tax avoidance is stronger when the firm’s home country has a 
more complex tax system or when there are fewer external tax consulting services. 
Lastly, we conduct an exploratory analysis of the value implications of leisure preference. We 
find that firm value is lower in countries with a stronger preference for leisure. This finding is 
consistent with the notion that effort aversion (as captured by leisure preference) creates a 
significant disincentive for value-enhancing activities. What interests us more is the extent to 
which leisure preference lowers firm value via its impact on corporate tax planning. Through a 
path analysis, we find that corporate tax planning mediates around 5% of the negative association 
between leisure preference and firm value. This result suggests that leisure preference is a non-
negligible source of agency costs that causes firm value to be lower than it otherwise could be, 
consistent with the prescient warning of Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
                                                 
6 There are many discussions in the business media on how the overly complicated tax system in the U.S. has imposed 
unduly heavy burdens on businesses and individuals, and caused them to pass up legitimate tax-saving opportunities 
such as governmental tax breaks and subsidies (e.g., McKinnon (2012)). A recent working paper, Zwick (2018), also 
finds that corporate tax complexity significantly deters eligible U.S. firms from claiming refunds for tax losses.  
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We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we introduce a new source of agency 
conflict into the context of corporate tax planning. An examination of agency conflict in corporate 
tax planning is important, as agency costs are important non-tax costs in Scholes and Wolfson’s 
(1992) “all parties, all taxes, and all costs” framework (Shackelford and Shevlin (2001)). Prior 
studies have identified two sources of agency problems associated with corporate tax planning — 
managerial rent extraction and managerial risk aversion. Nevertheless, neither agency views are 
consistently supported by empirical evidence. In this paper, we propose incorporation of a third, 
important, source of agency conflict: managerial effort aversion (Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003)). Using a novel measure of cross-country variation in leisure 
preference to quantify effort aversion, we find evidence suggesting that effort aversion (as captured 
by leisure preference) is an important consideration in tax planning decisions and provides 
managers with a disincentive for engaging in corporate tax planning. 
Second, we shed new light on the “under-sheltering puzzle” that has long baffled tax scholars. 
Weisbach (2002) is among the first to question why firms do not fully take advantage of tax 
planning opportunities given the relatively low risk of tax audits and penalties. Experimental tax 
research also suggests that tax compliance appears to be higher than implied by plausible audit 
rates, penalties, and levels of risk aversion (Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1992), Kleven, 
Knudsen, Kreiner, Pedersen, and Saez (2011)). The under-sheltering puzzle stimulates recent 
research on factors that possibly induce underinvestment in corporate tax planning, such as 
religiosity and trust (Boone, Khurana, and Raman (2012), Hasan, Hoi, Wu, and Zhang (2017)).  
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Our study adds to this strand of literature by suggesting managerial leisure preference as another 
hindrance to value-maximizing corporate tax avoidance. 
Finally, our study contributes to the literature that explores the implications of managerial effort 
aversion. While managerial effort aversion is an important theoretical construct of agency conflict, 
empirical tests of its implications have been difficult because effort aversion is unobservable and 
thus hard to quantify. Previous studies have to make inferences about the existence of managerial 
effort aversion from the relation between intensity of certain corporate activities (such as 
restructurings) and corporate governance mechanisms, for example, takeover threats (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003)), public ownership (Bernstein (2015)), and shareholder activism (Cheng et 
al. (2012)). We complement these studies by providing a novel way to quantify managerial effort 
aversion. We draw on the standard economic modeling of an agent’s utility function and use leisure 
preference to capture the agent’s tendency of effort aversion.  
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops our hypothesis. 
Section 3 discusses the research design. Section 4 presents baseline results and robustness tests. 
Section 5 conducts cross-sectional analyses, and examines value implications of leisure preference. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
I. Leisure Preference and Tax Planning 
A. Related Literature 
Over the past decades, corporate tax planning literature has evolved within the Scholes and 
Wolfson’s (1992) “all costs, all taxes, all parties” framework. Earlier studies focus on how 
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financial reporting costs are incorporated into corporate tax planning. Agency costs as important 
non-tax costs have received little attention prior to 2000s. As Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) note, 
“[r]esearch addressing taxes and agency costs is much less well developed.” 
Desai and Dharmapala (2006) identify the first source of agency problem associated with 
corporate tax planning. They argue that corporate tax planning and managerial rent diversion are 
complementarities. The essential underlying premise is that corporate tax planning often engenders 
opaqueness, which can be exploited by managers to mask their rent extraction activities, such as 
earnings management, related-party transactions, and perquisite consumption. This agency view 
underpins many subsequent studies. For example, Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin (2010) find 
that family firms use less aggressive tax planning strategies to alleviate concerns from minority 
shareholders over their possible rent extraction behaviors. Lanis and Richardson (2011) find that 
more outside directors on a board reduce corporate tax planning. The reason is that outside 
directors are more effective in monitoring managers’ rent extraction behaviors. Kim, Li, and Zhang 
(2011) find that corporate tax planning increases stock price crash risk because managers are able 
to hoard bad news with opaque tax avoidance transactions. A central assumption underlying Desai 
and Dharmapala’s (2006) rent extraction argument as well as its subsequent studies is that 
corporate tax planning creates information opaqueness. However, more recent studies have begun 
to challenge this assumption. For example, Gallemore and Labro (2015) find that corporate tax 
planning is associated with better internal information environment. 7  Similarly, Lennox, 
                                                 
7 They use four proxies for internal information quality: (1) the speed with which management releases earnings 
announcements; (2) the accuracy of earnings forecast; (3) the absence of material weakness in internal control; and 
(4) the absence of restatement due to errors. 
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Lisowsky, and Pittman (2013) find that tax aggressive firms are less likely to commit accounting 
fraud. These results suggest a positive association between corporate tax planning and information 
transparency, contradicting Desai and Dharmapala’s (2006) assumption about the implication of 
corporate tax planning for information opaqueness. 
More recent studies take an alternative agency view on corporate tax planning. Rego and Wilson 
(2012) suggest that corporate tax planning is a form of risky investment to firms and their 
managers. When managers are risk averse, they are reluctant to undertake risky tax planning 
strategies due to career concerns. However, whether corporate tax planning is risky is still 
inconclusive. While Dyreng et al. (2017) find that tax aggressive firms bear greater tax uncertainty, 
Guenther et al. (2017) find little evidence that corporate tax planning is associated with overall 
firm risk. Furthermore, evidenced is mixed as to whether corporate tax planning intensifies 
managers’ career concerns. Gallemore et al. (2014) find no evidence that aggressive corporate tax 
planning increases forced CEO turnover. Chyz and Gaertner (2018), however, find that corporate 
tax planning does affect forced CEO turnover, but their relation is U-shaped. That is, both too 
much and too little corporate tax planning contribute to forced CEO turnover. These results cast 
doubt on the risk-related agency theory of corporate tax planning.  
B. Effort aversion 
In this study, we introduce a new agency perspective on corporate tax planning. We view 
corporate tax planning as a complex task that requires substantial effort inputs and thus are 
undesirable to effort averse managers.  
Though largely neglected in the tax planning literature, effort aversion has been one of the 
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quintessential perspectives in the agency framework since the seminal work of Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). Jensen and Meckling emphasize that managerial effort aversion is likely the 
most important source of agency conflict between managers and shareholders. A manager may 
avoid value-maximizing activities because they require too much trouble or effort on her part. 
Such avoidance of personal costs can result in a significant loss of firm value. These arguments 
are consistent with the long-held observation in history and literature that human beings tend to 
avoid efforts (physical and spiritual), desire ease and comfort, and recline on “a bed of sloth”. This 
“innate” distaste of effort is characterized by Goethe in his classic, Faust. In the Prologue in 
Heaven, the Lord remarks: “For man’s activity can easily abate, / He soon prefers uninterrupted 
rest; / To give him this companion hence seems best / Who roils and must as Devil help create.”8 
The tendency of managers to avoid spending efforts is empirically supported by Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003). Their finding suggests that, after a reduction in takeover threats, managers 
are less willing to destroy old plants as well as create new ones, both of which demand considerable 
efforts. They conclude that managers prefer a quiet life to empire building. 
Empirically, effort aversion is difficult to observe and quantify. In this paper, we use an 
innovative approach to capture and measure managerial effort aversion based on survey responses 
on civic attitudes toward work and leisure. These attitudes toward work and leisure “have been 
central themes in human cultural development since the earliest times” (Haworth and Veal (2004)).  
                                                 
8 Goethe's Faust, trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Anchor Books, 1962. 
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How leisure preference affects the choice of effort can be illustrated by the following utility 
function of a representative agent (Bitler, Moskowitz, Vissing-Jorgensen (2005)): 
𝑈(𝑐, 𝑢) =
1
1−𝑟
(𝑐∅(1 − 𝑢)𝜃)1−𝑟,         (1) 
where u is work effort, 1 − u is leisure, and θ is leisure preference.9 Work effort causes disutility 
while leisure adds to the utility. Effort aversion, therefore, is attributed to the reluctance to forgo 
leisure (Sudit (2012)). A stronger preference for leisure makes an agent attach greater importance 
to leisure over work in her utility function. In other words, leisure preference causes more disutility 
for a given level of effort and, therefore, results in more severe effort aversion. 
Several recent studies also use international surveys of cultural values to measure leisure 
preference.10 Specifically, Giavazzi, Schiantarelli, and Serafinelli (2009) use the World Values 
Survey (WVS) and the European Social Survey (ESS) to measure individual attitudes toward work 
and leisure. They find that leisure preference is an important determinant of both women 
employment rates and hours worked. Using ESS, Moriconi and Peri (2016) document an 
economically significant effect of leisure preference on individual employment rates across 
European countries. Following these two studies, we exploit the cross-country variation in leisure 
preference revealed in WVS and examine its implications for corporate tax planning. 
                                                 
9 u and 1- u can be understood as the fractions of time devoted to work and leisure, respectively. Such a “residual” 
definition of leisure is widely accepted and used in the literature (e.g., Roberts (1999)). It is certainly a simplifying 
assumption, given the need to allocate time to other activities (such as sleeping and eating). However, time for these 
other activities is relatively nondiscretionary and usually either neglected or modeled as a constant term. Therefore, 
the principal tradeoff for the agent is to choose between work and leisure.  
10 Elgin and Yucel (2014) adopt a different approach. They construct a dynamic general equilibrium model and back 
out values of leisure preference. 
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C. Hypothesis development 
Corporate tax planning is a demanding task that requires significant efforts. First, to identify 
constantly changing tax planning opportunities (Milles, Erickson, and Maydew (1998)), managers 
need to maintain a thorough understanding of firm operations, including firms’ business model, 
production process, segment operations, and related party transactions. Next, managers need to 
apply tax law to business operations. Often, tax law is complex, and tax rules and regulations 
change frequently over time. Thus, learning and updating tax knowledge are also effort consuming. 
Even if managers may not themselves design tax planning schemes but instead rely on assistance 
from internal and external tax experts, managers, as the ones who “set the tone at top”, still need 
to evaluate and choose among alternative tax planning strategies. This makes an understanding of 
firm operations and tax knowledge the necessary effort inputs in developing tax planning 
opportunities. 
Second, implementing tax planning strategies requires substantial efforts to coordinate and 
rebalance corporate resources. Many tax planning strategies involve inter-department 
coordination. For example, an investment in municipal bonds requires coordination between the 
tax department and the financing department, and tilts capital structure choices toward debt 
financing. Tax planning strategies using, for example, first-in-first-out (FIFO) and last-in-first-out 
(LIFO) financial reporting methods require firms to balance tax reporting and financial reporting, 
and to coordinate between the tax department and the accounting department. Some tax planning 
strategies need inter-segment coordination. For example, tax haven operations entail the 
establishment of new subsidiaries and compliance with foreign tax laws. Transfer pricing 
  
14 
 
transactions rely upon coordination of production activities between the parent company and 
foreign subsidiaries. Certain tax planning strategies even necessitate inter-company coordination. 
For instance, lease-in-lease-out (LILO) transactions require firms to lease a long-lived property 
from a third party and lease out immediately to the same party. Such extensive and subtle planning, 
balancing, and coordination could make tax planning a daunting task for managers.  
Third, securing savings from tax planning activities is also practically and legally challenging.11 
Tax planning activities are subject to tax audits, fines, and penalties. Upon tax audits, tax 
authorities not only have access to firms’ tax-related information, but also other relevant 
information including all their books, records, and papers. Therefore, firms need to spend 
substantial efforts to communicate and negotiate with tax authorities during the periods of tax 
audits. In addition, tax planning activities often arouse tax disputes between firms and tax 
authorities due to the complexity and ambiguity of tax laws (Hanlon, Maydew, and Saavedra 
(2017)). To resolve tax disputes, firms and tax authorities often turn to tax arbitrages or tax courts. 
However, the resolution process can be both convoluted and protracted.   
For the aforementioned reasons, corporate tax planning takes significant managerial effort and 
is personally costly.12 As a result, managers who are effort-averse can be reluctant to engage in 
this laborious task. With other factors kept constant, the preference for leisure amplifies a 
                                                 
11 For instance, in a legal dispute with IRS over its disallowance of 17 years’ federal research tax credits, Bayer Group 
complained that it would take many years to gather all the required documents to fully comply with the IRS demand 
(McKinnon (2012)).   
12 Firm managers could hire tax consultants and attorneys to partially alleviate the burden. However, such external 
help can be expensive, or is not always readily available. Even with outside help, tax planning process can still 
consume a significant amount of time and effort for firm managers and employees.  
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manager’s loss of utility due to work. Given that corporate tax planning is an onerous task, 
managers who have a greater preference for leisure should engage less in corporate tax planning. 
We therefore hypothesize a negative association between leisure preference and corporate tax 
planning. 
 
II. Data and Empirical Strategy 
A. Empirical proxy for leisure preference 
Our measure of leisure preference comes from the World Values Survey (WVS) database.13 
The WVS provides six survey waves on a number of cultural values, beliefs, and attitudes across 
countries (Wave 1: 1981-1984; Wave 2: 1990-1994; Wave 3: 1995-1998; Wave 4: 1999-2004; 
Wave 5: 2005-2009; and Wave 6: 2010-2014). We focus on the survey question: “Indicate how 
important leisure time is in your life, very important, rather important, not very important, and not 
at all important?”14,15  Based on survey responses to this question, we use the percentage of 
                                                 
13 The World Values Survey database is maintained by an international team of scholars affiliated with World Values 
Survey Association and World Values Survey Association Secretariat. The database provides survey data starting from 
1981 and covers a large number of countries worldwide. The WVS database has been used by many studies in 
economics, for example, Knack and Keefer (1997), Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004), Alesina et al. (2004),  
Alesina and Angeletos (2005), Giavazzi, Schiantarelli, and Serafinelli (2009), Guiso et al. (2004), and Layard et al. 
(2008).   
14 To measure leisure preference, Moriconi and Peri (2016) use the survey responses to the question: “I would enjoy 
having a paid job even if I did not need the money.” However, this question is available in only one wave of the ESS 
surveys, preventing them from capturing the intertemporal shifts in leisure preference. By comparison, the survey 
question used in our study is available for all waves of WVS surveys. 
15 The survey question used by Giavazzi, Schiantarelli, and Serafinelli (2009) is “Here are some more aspects of a job 
that people say are important. Please look at them and tell me which ones you personally think are important in a job”, 
where 1 denotes generous holidays being mentioned, and 0 otherwise. We believe that preference for generous 
holidays is likely one of many dimensions of leisure preference. In contrast, our survey question more directly asks 
about individual attitudes toward leisure, and provides an evaluation of overall leisure preference.  
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respondents who answer “very important” to quantify leisure preference.16 Gennaioli, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2012) use a similar way to quantify trust based on the World 
Values Survey database. A higher value of this measure indicates that agents in this country attach 
greater importance to leisure.  
In Figure 1, we plot time-series of leisure preference for a few countries that are most heavily 
represented in our sample. We find a large cross-sectional variation in leisure preference among 
these sample countries. There is also a large time-series variation in leisure preference across years. 
To validate our measure of leisure preference, we present a scatter plot of leisure preference against 
actual weekly leisure hours in Figure 2. Data on weekly leisure hours (which is computed as total 
number of hours per week minus weekly hours worked) are obtained from the International Labor 
Organization. Consistent with prior research (Giavazzi, Schiantarelli, and Serafinelli 
(2009), Moriconi and Peri (2016)), we find a positive association between leisure preference and 
the number of weekly leisure hours. This positive association gives credence to our leisure 
preference measure as a reasonable proxy for effort aversion.  
B. Empirical proxy for corporate tax planning 
Following two prior international tax studies, Atwood, Drake, Myers, and Myers (2012) and 
Li, Maydew, Willis, and Xu (2017), we use the formula below to calculate corporate tax planning.  
                                                 
16 Inferences are unchanged if we compute leisure preference as a weighted average response. Specifically, we assign 
numerical values 1-4 to “not at all important”, “not very important”, “rather important”, and “very important”, 
respectively. Each of the numerical values is then weighted by the corresponding percentage of people who answer 
“yes”. Next we aggregate these weighted values and scale the total score by 4. 
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𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 =
∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝜏𝑗𝑡 − ∑ 𝐶𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑡+2
𝑡
𝑡+2
𝑡
∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑡+2
𝑡
.           (2) 
In Equation (2), TA denotes long-run corporate tax planning. PTE is pre-tax earnings. 𝜏 is home 
country statutory corporate income tax rate. 𝑃𝑇𝐸 × 𝜏 is tax on pre-tax income. It approximates 
the amount of taxes that should be paid. CTP is cash taxes paid. It captures the amount of taxes 
that is actually paid. A larger difference between the two indicates that firms actually pay less taxes 
as required and thus save more taxes through tax planning. This difference is further scaled by pre-
tax earnings. Data on tax items come from Compustat Global database. Data on home country 
statutory income tax rates come from KPMG corporate tax rates table and the Trade Economics 
database.17 
C. Empirical model 
    To examine the association between leisure preference and tax planning, we follow the 
empirical strategy used in Liang and Renneboog (2017) and specify our baseline regression as 
follows: 
        𝑇𝐴 = 𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝐼𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸 + Σ𝑋 + Σ𝑍 + 𝛼 + 𝛿 + 𝜃 +  𝜀,                (3) 
where TA is tax planning, calculated in Equation (2). LEISURE is leisure preference, constructed 
based on the World Values Survey database. Our focus is the coefficient on LEISURE. It captures 
                                                 
17 When the data on cash taxes paid are missing, we replace the missing values with current tax expenses defined as 
total tax expenses minus deferred taxes.  
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the association between leisure preference and tax planning. A negative coefficient on LEISURE 
will suggest that leisure preference creates a disincentive for corporate tax planning.   
We add standard control variables following Atwood et al. (2012) and Li et al. (2017). We 
control for firm-level variables that potentially affect corporate tax planning. We first include a set 
of firm characteristics, including fundamental firm characteristics (ROA, SIZE, LEV, GROWTH, 
MULTI). Second, we control for tangible and intangible assets (RD, PPE, INTAG), and financial 
reporting (DA, DWC, DNCO, DFIN). Next, we include a set of country-level factors that capture 
country tax system characteristics such as conformity in book and tax reporting (BTC), worldwide 
versus territorial tax system (WW), statutory tax rate (TAXRATE), and tax enforcement (TR). We 
also control for country-level economic, financial, legal, and political development (GDP, 
FINDEVP, LEGAL, CRP). Appendix A details variable definitions and data sources. 
We include year fixed effects (𝛼) and industry fixed effects (𝛿) to control for differences in tax 
planning incentives across years and industries. Country fixed effects (𝜃) are included to purge 
time-invariant country characteristics such as legal origin and religion. Standard errors are 
clustered at the country level because our variable of interest is country-specific.  
 
III. Results 
A. Descriptive statistics 
We start by identifying firm-years from 1992 to 2013 of all countries covered by both the 
Compustat Global database and the World Value Survey database. Our sample starts in 1992 
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because this is the first year in which Compustat Global database became available. We end our 
sample in 2013 due to the data requirement for computing our long-run tax avoidance measure.18 
Our initial sample has 67 countries and 473,479 firm-year observations. We require all the 
variables used in our main analysis have non-missing values. This requirement restricts our sample 
to 54 countries and 193,995 observations. Further, we exclude from our sample those countries 
with fewer than 50 observations. This leaves us with 49 countries and 193,871 observations. 
Finally, we remove 8 countries with only one wave of WVS data because our implementation of 
the country fixed effects estimation requires at least two waves of data per country. Our final 
sample has 41 countries and 186,870 observations.  
Figure 3 plots a world map for leisure preference and tax planning. We also report leisure 
preference and tax planning by country in Table I.19 The least leisure-preferring countries are Viet 
Nam (0.490), Pakistan (0.507), Morocco (0.532), Philippines (0.554), Egypt (0.559), and China 
(0.579). For these countries, only about half of survey respondents believe that leisure is “very 
important” in their daily lives. At the same time, countries with greatest tax avoidance include 
Morocco (0.233), South Korea (0.231), Argentina (0.191), Colombia (0.189), Brazil (0.189), and 
China (0.173). Firms in these countries pay about 20 percent lower taxes as required by the 
government.  
Table II formally compares tax planning between strong and weak leisure preference countries. 
We first note that the mean value of tax planning (TA) for the full sample is equal to 0.089, very 
                                                 
18 At the time of the empirical analysis, the last year in which we have complete Compustat Global data is 2016. 
19 The sample periods differ across countries, mainly because country coverage varies in different waves of WVS 
surveys. In addition, statutory tax rates are sometimes missing in certain years for some countries.   
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similar to the value of 0.084 reported in Atwood et al. (2012). Comparisons of the mean values of 
tax planning (TA) show that firms located in countries with weak leisure preference engage more 
in tax planning. A parametric test (t-test) shows that this difference is significant at the 1% level. 
Comparisons of median values of tax planning (TA) yield a similar result. A non-parametric test 
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test) suggests that the difference is significant at the 1% level. Overall, these 
descriptive statistics reveal a systematic difference in tax planning between strong and weak leisure 
preference countries. We also find systematic differences in other firm and country characteristics 
between these two groups of countries. In particular, firms located in strong leisure preference 
countries tend to be more mature, rely more on intangible assets, report lower accruals, and appear 
to underperform. Also, countries with strong leisure preference impose high statutory tax rates, are 
more likely to adopt a territorial tax system, and require lower book-tax conformity. Leisure-
preferring countries also have better economic, financial, legal, and political development than 
their more industrious peers. These statistics suggest that it is important to control for these firm- 
and country- level variables. 
 
B. Main Results 
Table III reports our baseline regression results examining the impact of leisure preference on 
corporate tax planning. Columns (1) - (4) include different sets of control variables. In Column 
(1), we add no controls but the country-, year-, and industry-fixed effects. We find that the 
coefficient on LEISURE is significantly negative (-0.912, t = -5.57). In Column (2), we add firm-
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level controls. The coefficient on LEISURE remains significantly negative (-0.904, t = -5.52), and 
the magnitude of the coefficient is similar to that in Column (1). This suggests that leisure 
preference is almost orthogonal to firm-level controls. In Column (3), we add country-level 
controls. The coefficient on LEISURE remains negative (-0.348, t = -3.27). However, the 
magnitude of the coefficient drops, suggesting that leisure preference is potentially correlated with 
other country-level forces that affect corporate tax planning. In Column (4), we add the full set of 
control variables including the country-, year-, and industry-fixed effects. Again, the coefficient 
on LEISURE remains significantly negative (-0.338, t = -3.24). The result is economically 
significant as well. Moving from the 25th percentile of leisure preference (0.705) to its 75th 
percentile (0.898) increases tax payments by 6.52% (=0.338  0.193) of pre-tax earnings.  
Overall, results with a set of control variables consistently support that leisure preference 
impedes tax planning activities. The signs of estimated coefficients on firm-level and country-level 
variables are generally consistent with those reported in Atwood et al. (2012) and Li et al. (2017). 
C. Robustness tests 
C.1. Alternative Leisure Preference Measures 
We next examine whether our results are sensitive to alternative ways to quantify leisure 
preference. Our baseline regression uses a raw measure of leisure preference. We first examine 
whether our baseline result is sensitive to a relative measure of leisure preference. We define 
relative leisure preference as the ratio of leisure preference over work preference. Specifically, we 
divide the percentage of survey respondents who believe leisure to be “very important” in their 
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lives by the percentage of survey respondents who believe work to be “very important.” Column 
(1) of Table IV, Panel A reports the results. We find that the coefficient on relative leisure 
preference remains negative and significant. We also define a residual measure of leisure 
preference. This test is motivated by the concern that leisure preference is likely to be affected by 
other country-specific factors, such as demographics, economic conditions, and governmental 
labor policies. To reduce this concern, we calculate residual leisure preference by estimating a 
two-stage regression model. 20  In the first stage, we select potential determinants of leisure 
preference and estimate the regression residuals. In the second stage, we replace leisure preference 
with the residual leisure preference. Elgin and Yucel (2014) find that country-level leisure 
preference is associated with economic development, openness, temperature, population structure, 
and unemployment. We include in the first-stage regression all these variables. Variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix A. We find that consumption decreases leisure preference, 
whereas an elder population increases leisure preference.21 Column (2) of Table IV, Panel A 
reports the second-stage regression. We find that the residual leisure preference is still negatively 
associated with corporate tax planning.  
C.2. Alternative Samples 
We next examine whether our results are sensitive to alternative samples. Our sample comprises 
countries with a varied number of observations. Thus, it is likely that our results are unduly 
                                                 
20 A similar approach is used in Jenter and Lewellen (2015), who examine the impact of CEO retirement preferences 
on acquisitions. 
21 The first-stage regression results are reported in Internet Appendix table IA.I.  
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influenced by certain countries. We use alternative samples to alleviate this problem. First, we 
follow the methodology used in Atwood et al. (2012) to re-estimate our baseline regression using 
(1) country-year medians and (2) country-industry-year medians. Table IV, Panel B reports the 
results. We still observe a negative association between leisure preference and tax planning with 
these two samples. Second, we follow the methodology used in DeFond, Hung, Li, and Li (2015) 
to drop one country at a time from our sample. In untabulated results, inferences remain the same.  
 
C.3. Alternative Theories 
In this section, we perform tests to rule out a variety of alternative explanations for our main 
finding. First, agents in strong leisure preference countries may be reluctant to undertake other 
corporate activities, such as investment and financing activities. Thus, the effect of leisure 
preference on tax planning can be a natural outcome of lost tax saving opportunities afforded by 
these other corporate activities. We examine whether the association between leisure preference 
and tax planning captures the effect of other effort consuming activities. To do so, we add to our 
baseline regression a number of corporate investment and financing variables, including capital 
investment (CAPX), acquisition (ACQ), equity and debt issuance (EISSUE and DISSUE). Column 
(5) of Table IV, Panel C shows that the coefficient estimate on LEISURE is little affected by the 
inclusion of other corporate activities.   
Second, leisure preference could capture the effects of product market competition. 
Specifically, countries with strong leisure preference might also have a less competitive product 
market, which condones wastes and inefficiencies in firm operations including tax planning. To 
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rule out product market competition as an alternative explanation, we control for the revenue-
based industry Herfindahl index. Column (6) of Table IV, Panel C shows that the coefficient 
estimate on LEISURE is largely the same.  
Third, leisure preference might capture attitudes toward risk. Strong leisure preference can 
indicate greater risk aversion. We construct a measure of risk aversion from the World Values 
Survey database by calculating the percentage of respondents who answer “not at all” to the survey 
question “It is important to this person adventure and taking risks.” A higher value of this measure 
indicates a greater level of risk aversion. Column (7) of Table IV, Panel C reports the results 
controlling for risk aversion. We find that the coefficient estimate on LEISURE is similar as before.  
Next, leisure preference may be correlated with tax morale, which in turn affects both tax 
compliance and tax enforcement. Specifically, residents in weak leisure preference countries 
(which tend to be economically and institutionally less developed) may find cheating on taxes 
more tolerable. As a result, tax payers have fewer scruples about evading taxes and also face lower 
costs and penalties. Alternatively, tax payers in weak leisure preference countries might have less 
trust in their government in public spending of tax revenue. Both explanations could have driven 
the observed negative relation between leisure preference and corporate tax avoidance. We 
construct two tax morale variables from the World Value Survey database. One variable describes 
the justifiability of cheating on taxes and the other describes trust in government. Column (8) of 
Table IV, Panel C reports the results controlling for tax morale. We find that the coefficient 
estimate on LEISURE is not affected by the inclusion of tax morale variables, albeit tolerance of 
tax cheating indeed increases tax avoidance. 
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Finally, government might have taken leisure preference into consideration when designing the 
tax system. This creates a possibility that leisure preference simply captures the heterogeneity in 
country tax system, which is not sufficiently controlled by those tax system attributes currently 
controlled in the regression (such as BTC, TR and WW).22 To rule out this alternative story, we 
follow Keller and Schanz (2013) and include an aggregate tax attractiveness index, which captures 
16 dimensions of a country’s tax system. Column (9) of Table IV, Panel C reports the results. We 
find that the coefficient on LEISURE remains significantly negative and that the coefficient on tax 
system attractiveness per se is not significant.23  
 
IV. Evidence from Work Time Reforms 
   The results so far support an average effect of leisure preference on tax planning, with leisure 
preference being negatively associated with tax planning. In this section, we examine a marginal 
effect of leisure preference on tax planning by exploiting the staggered work time reforms 
worldwide. The advance of leisure time indicates an increased preference for leisure (Cunningham 
(2014)). Work time legislations have been used by many governments to coordinate and alter 
attitudes toward work and leisure among individuals (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2005)). For 
instance, the UK has achieved expansion in leisure time principally through increases in paid 
holiday entitlement, from a norm of three weeks or less in 1971 to a norm of four weeks or more 
                                                 
22 Another concern is that a government might consider its citizens’ leisure preference when setting its statutory tax 
rate. As shown in Internet Appendix table IA.II, we regress statutory tax rate on leisure preference (and controls), and 
find that these two are insignificantly related. 
23 We also re-estimate the regression by including all alternative explanations simultaneously. Results are reported in 
Internet Appendix table IA.III. 
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in the late 1980s (Haworth and Veal (2004)). Such increases in the availability of leisure time 
could reassert the status of leisure in the national culture and make people assign more importance 
to leisure over work. Alternatively, increases in leisure time could facilitate the realization of 
individual leisure preferences, which might have been previously constrained by lack of free time. 
Therefore, these reforms can be viewed as quasi-experimental shocks to leisure preference.  
We identify work time reforms from the CBR Leximetric Datasets. The CBR Leximetric 
Datasets summarize labor laws for 117 countries over the period 1970 to 2013. Appendix B shows 
the details about country-years in our sample that had these work time reforms. Work time reforms 
involve changes in (1) annual leave entitlements, (2) public holiday entitlements, (3) limits to 
overtime working, (4) duration of the normal working, (5) maximum daily working time.24  
Work time reforms provide us with an ideal setting to document a marginal effect of leisure 
preference on tax planning for at least two reasons. First, the staggered nature of work time reforms 
allows us to implement a difference-in-differences estimation. The treatment firms are those 
located in countries subject to at least one work time reform, which are compared with themselves 
prior to the reform and firms located in countries with no work time reform. Second, using the 
work time reforms enables us to detect an asymmetric effect of leisure preference, if any. Since 
some work time reforms advance leisure time while others shorten it, we are able to determine 
whether tax planning reacts to an increase or a decrease in leisure preference, or both. Following 
                                                 
24 The CBR Leximetric Datasets identify seven forms of work time reforms. In addition to the five mentioned above, 
the other two forms are (1) overtime premium and (2) weekend working. These two reforms concern changes in 
premium for overtime working, and thus are less relevant for our purpose. In a robustness check reported in Internet 
Appendix table IA.IV, we incorporate these two forms of work time reforms and find similar results.   
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the empirical strategy used in Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) and Mukherjee, Singh, and Žaldokas 
(2017), we specify the difference-in-differences estimation as: 
∆𝑇𝐴𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑊𝑇𝑅𝑡−1
+ + 𝛽2𝑊𝑇𝑅𝑡−1
− + 𝜃∆𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛿∆𝑍𝑡−1 + 𝛼 + 𝜀𝑡,     (4) 
where ∆  is the first-differencing operator. The changes model specification helps remove 
unobserved firm-specific fixed effects and better accommodates repeated shocks (Heider and 
Ljungqvistm (2015)). The dependent variable is future change in tax planning. 𝑊𝑇𝑅𝑡−1
+  and 
𝑊𝑇𝑅𝑡−1
−  are indicators equal to 1 if a country implements a work time reform in the previous year 
that increases or decreases leisure time, respectively. We add the same set of control variables as 
in Equation (2). 𝑋  and Z represent firm-level and country-level controls, respectively. 𝛼  are 
industry-year fixed effects used to remove time-varying industry-level shocks. ε is the error term. 
Standard errors are clustered at the country level.  
 Table V reports our difference-in-differences regression results. We find that the coefficient 
on 𝑊𝑇𝑅+  is significantly negative, whereas the coefficient on 𝑊𝑇𝑅−  is insignificant. These 
results suggest an asymmetric effect of leisure preference on tax planning. Firms reduce tax 
planning after leisure time is advanced. However, there is no evidence that tax planning increases 
after leisure time is shortened. In terms of the economic significance, after a work reform that 
increases leisure preference, firms reduce tax planning intensity by 140 basis points.   
V. Economic Mechanism 
Our baseline results show a negative association between leisure preference and tax planning. 
We argue that that a stronger preference for leisure makes managers more averse to efforts and, 
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thus, reduces their engagement in demanding tax planning activities. If effort aversion is the 
underlying economic mechanism, we should find that the negative association between leisure 
preference and tax planning is more pronounced when tax planning is particularly complicated and 
onerous for agents. To test for this underlying mechanism, we identify two such situations.  
The first moderating factor we consider is home country tax system complexity. A complicated 
country tax system entails more efforts in corporate tax planning and should aggravate shirking by 
effort-averse managers. To measure tax system complexity, we use data on hours spent on 
preparing, filing, and paying taxes (Lawless (2013)). The data are obtained from the World Bank 
Paying Taxes Database. Because the data start in 2005 and are not available for most of our sample 
years, we construct a time-invariant tax system complexity variable (TAXCOMP).25 We interact 
tax system complexity (TAXCOMP) with leisure preference (LEISURE). Our variable of interest 
is this interaction variable. Table VI, Column (1) reports the results.26 We find that the coefficient 
on this interaction is significantly negative (-0.388, t=-2.04). Therefore, a complex home country 
tax system strengthens the negative association between leisure preference and corporate tax 
planning. This finding suggests that leisure preference induces even less tax planning in the 
presence of a complex country tax system. 
The second moderator is the access to external tax consulting. Corporate tax planning is more 
challenging and demanding when firms are located in countries with less access to outside tax 
                                                 
25 As shown in Lawless (2012), there is very little variation in tax system complexity across years. The year-over-
year correlation approximates 95%. 
26 The two moderator variables are not reported in Table VI because their effects are subsumed by the country fixed 
effects. 
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consulting. We use the number of tax consulting firms within a given country to measure firms’ 
access to external assistance in tax planning. Information on major tax consultants is obtained from 
International Tax Review (ITR) World Tax. The ITR World Tax divides tax consulting firms into 
different tiers (in most cases, tier-1 and tier-2). We scale the number of tier-1 tax consulting firms 
by the total number of publicly listed firms. As before, we create a time-invariant tax consulting 
variable (TAXCONSULT), as we can only obtain the latest information on tax consulting. We 
interact this variable with leisure preference (LEISURE). Our focus is the interaction between these 
two variables. Table VI, Column (2) reports the results. We find a significant positive association 
on this interaction term (0.592, t = 3.22). That is, greater access to external tax consulting services 
weakens the negative association between leisure preference and corporate tax planning. 
VI. Value Implications 
 We next examine the value implications of leisure preference. If leisure preference suggests 
effort aversion that potentially impedes value-enhancing corporate tax planning, we should find 
leisure preference to be negatively associated with firm value. We use Tobin’s Q as a measure of 
firm value, as in most cross-country studies (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002), Lins 
(2003), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2002), Fauver, Hung, Li, and Taboada, 
(2017), Li et al. (2017)).  
Table VII reports the results from examining the association between leisure preference and 
firm value. Column (1) only adds leisure preference and no control variables except for the 
country-, year-, and industry-fixed effects. We find that leisure preference is negatively associated 
  
30 
 
with firm value. In Column (2), we follow Villalonga and Amit (2006) and add a set of standard 
controls of firm value. We find that the negative impact of leisure preference on firm value 
continues to hold. In Column (3), we add the same set of control-level controls as in our baseline 
regression. Again, the coefficient on LEISURE remains significantly negative. Column (4) adds 
the full set of control variables and shows a similar result (-1.244, t =-3.16).  
We next perform the path analysis to determine whether corporate tax planning serves as a path 
through which leisure preference lowers firm value. Figure 4 depicts the influence of leisure 
preference on firm value via corporate tax planning. Our baseline results have established a 
negative association between leisure preference and corporate tax planning (path a). In addition, 
prior studies suggest a positive association between corporate tax planning and firm value (Desai 
and Dharmapala, 2009). Therefore, the mediated path by corporate tax planning (path a × path b) 
should be negative. This way, corporate tax planning should mediate the effect of leisure 
preference on firm value. 
Table VIII reports the results on path analysis. We find that the direct path from leisure 
preference to firm value is significantly negative across all the specifications. In the mediated path 
for corporate tax planning, we first find a negative relation between leisure preference and tax 
planning, consistent with our baseline finding. Second, we find that corporate tax planning 
improves firm value, consistent with corporate tax planning on average being a value-enhancing 
activity. Sobel tests show that the mediated path by corporate tax planning is significant, equal to 
5.3% of the total effect of leisure preference on firm value. These results together suggest that 
effort aversion as captured by leisure preference impedes value-enhancing corporate tax planning. 
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VII. Conclusion 
The emerging literature on the agency views of corporate tax planning has been gradually 
growing, but yielded inconsistent results. In this paper, we propose a new source of agency 
problems — managerial effort aversion — as an often-neglected but important determinant of 
corporate tax planning. Specifically, we argue that corporate tax planning is a difficult and 
laborious process that requires substantial effort. Managers with greater effort aversion should be 
more reluctant to undertake these activities. Using the cross-country variation in leisure preference 
to quantify the degree of effort aversion, we find that leisure preference is negatively associated 
with corporate tax planning. This effect is stronger when the country tax system is more complex 
or when firms have less access to external assistance in tax planning. Finally, we have some 
evidence suggesting that one of the reasons that leisure preference lowers firm value is by 
providing managers with a disincentive to engage in value-increasing tax planning activities. 
It has been long recognized that shirking and inertia are pervasive in many settings, and 
especially severe when tasks are complex. Managers nowadays have to deal with a motley of 
challenging tasks that directly determine survival and success of their firms. It is thus critical to 
understand the effects of effort aversion on their decision-making. We advance the literature by 
providing the novel and important evidence on the relation between effort aversion and corporate 
tax planning.  
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Our study has at least three limitations, though. First, our research focuses on only one of the 
many daunting corporate tasks in which effort aversion creates economic wastes and inefficiencies. 
Future research could examine the implications of effort aversion for other corporate contexts 
including but not limited to product and process innovations, business expansions and divestitures, 
and capital structure decisions. 
Another limitation of our study is that we do not account for the possibility that tax planning 
and other corporate activities compete for managerial time and effort. It will be an interesting 
extension to examine how effort aversion affects the amount of effort allocated to corporate tax 
planning in a multi-task setting. For instance, an effort averse manager might shift her efforts away 
from tax planning to other value-maximizing activities in which she has more knowledge, 
experience, and skills. Alternatively, a manager with a tax background, either out of 
overconfidence, or to capitalize on her relative specialty, might overinvest in complicated tax 
avoidance transactions while being negligent of her other, less familiar, tasks. Lastly, instead of 
using country-level cultural surveys to capture managerial risk aversion, one might examine traits 
of individual managers (e.g., country of origins, personal background, prior experiences) to 
directly identify their attitudes toward work and leisure.   
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Figure 1. Evolution of country-level attitudes toward leisure 
 
Panel A. Western countries 
 
  Wave2 Wave3 Wave4 Wave5 Wave6 
Australia  0.885  0.896  0.908  0.877  
Canada   0.873  0.887   
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US   0.872  0.908  0.882  0.910  
Panel B. Asian countries 
 
  Wave2 Wave3 Wave4 Wave5 Wave6 
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Figure 2. Validation of the leisure preference measure 
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Figure 3. Tax avoidance and leisure preference by country 
 
Panel A. Country-level tax avoidance around the world 
 
 
Panel B. Leisure preference around the world (Source: World Values Survey) 
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Figure 4. Path analysis. 
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Appendix A 
Variable Definition 
VARIABLE DEFINITION SOURCE 
TA Following Atwood, Drake, Myers and Myers (2012) and Li, 
Maydew, Willis, and Xu (2017), we measure tax avoidance 
as pre-tax earnings before extraordinary items times 
statutory corporate income tax rate minus cash taxes paid, 
divided by pre-tax earnings before extraordinary items. We 
sum each element in the computation over three years (t, 
t+1, t+2). It is set to be missing if the denominator is less 
than or equal to zero.  
Compustat  
TOBINQ We measure firm value as Tobin’s Q, defined as the ratio of 
market value of equity plus the book value of debt to the 
book value of total assets. The book value of debt is the 
book value of total assets less the book value of equity less 
the deferred tax liability. We sum each element in the 
computation over three years (t, t+1, t+2). 
Compustat  
LEISURE The percentage of survey respondents who believe leisure to 
be “very important” in their daily lives.  
World Values 
Survey 
WTR+ An indicator variable equal to 1 if a country implements any 
of the five work time reforms that advance leisure time.  
CBR Leximetric 
Datasets  
WTR- An indicator variable equal to 1 if a country implements any 
of the five work time reforms that reduce leisure time.  
CBR Leximetric 
Datasets  
Relative Leisure The percentage of survey respondents who believe leisure to 
be “very important” in their daily lives over the percentage 
of survey respondents who believe work to be “very 
important” in their daily lives. 
World Values 
Survey 
Residual 
Leisure 
Regression residuals derived from regressing leisure 
preference on demographics, economic conditions, and 
governmental labor policies. 
Author’s 
calculation 
TAXCOMP The natural logarithm of time used to comply with tax law. World Bank 
TAXCONSULT The natural logarithm of the number of tie-1 tax consultants. International tax 
review 
ROA Pre-tax income less extraordinary items over total assets. Compustat 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets. Compustat 
LEV Sum of long-term debt and short-term debt over total assets. Compustat 
SALEGR Sales growth, calculated as growth in sales revenue from the 
previous year.  
Compustat 
MULTI An indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm’s foreign exchange 
gain/loss is not missing, and 0 otherwise.  
Compustat 
RD R&D expenses over total assets. Missing values are set to 
zero. 
Compustat 
INTAG Intangible assets over total assets. Compustat 
PPE Property, plant, and equipment over total assets. Compustat 
DA Accruals quality estimated using the Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model. 
Compustat 
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DWC Change in net non-cash working capital over total assets. Compustat 
DNCO Change in net noncurrent operating assets over total assets. Compustat 
DFIN Change in net financial asset over total assets. Compustat 
CAPX Capital expenditure over total assets. Compustat 
ACQ Acquisitions over total assets. Compustat 
EISSUE Equity issuance, measured as equity sales minus equity 
repurchases over total assets. 
Compustat 
DISSUE Debt issuance, measures as long-term debt issuance minus 
long-term debt reduction over total asset. 
Compustat 
INDHHI Industry concentration, measured as revenue-based 
Herfindahl index. 
Compustat 
INTEREST Interest expenses over total debt. Missing values are set to 
zero. 
Compustat 
DIVD Common dividend over total assets. Compustat 
AGE The natural logarithm of firm age, measured as current year 
minus the first year that a firm appears in Compustat.  
Compustat 
BTC Required book-tax conformity calculated following Atwood 
et al. (2010).  
Compustat 
EARNVOL Scaled decile rank of cross-sectional pre-tax earnings 
volatility by country-year. 
Compustat 
WW An indicator variable equal to 1 if a country adopts the 
worldwide tax system and 0 if it adopts the territorial tax 
system.  
KPMG tax table  
TAXRATE Statutory corporate income tax rate. KPMG corporate 
tax rates table 
and Trading 
Economics 
TR Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. World Bank 
GDP The natural logarithm of GDP. World Bank 
FINDEV Domestic credit provided by banking sector over GDP. World Bank 
LEGAL Ease of shareholder suits index. World Bank 
CRP Corruption Perception Index. A lower value indicates more 
corruption. 
Transparency 
International 
RISKAVR The percentage of survey respondents who believe that 
adventure and taking risks are “not at all” important to their 
lives. 
World Values 
Survey 
TAXCHEAT The percentage of survey respondents who believe that 
cheating on taxes is “always justifiable”. 
World Values 
Survey 
GOVTRUST The percentage of survey respondents who have “a great 
deal” of confidence on government. 
World Values 
Survey 
TAXSYS Average score of 16 different tax system attributes 
following Keller and Schanz (2013) 
Keller and 
Schanz (2013) 
YEAR Fiscal year. Compustat 
IND Fama-French 30 industry classification. Compustat 
COUNTRY ISO country (LOC). Compustat 
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Appendix B 
Work Time Reforms 
  
Annual Leave 
Entitlements 
  
Public Holiday 
Entitlements 
  
Limits to 
Overtime 
Working 
  
Limits of 
Maximum 
Duration of the 
Normal Working 
Week 
  
Limits of 
Maximum Daily 
Working Time 
Argentina   2010(+), 2011(+)  2000(-)     
Australia   1996(-), 2009(+)       
Canada   2000(+)       
Chile   
2004(+), 
2006(+), 2008(+) 
   2005(+)   
China 2007(+)      2008(+)   
Finland     1996(-)    1996(+) 
Germany 1995(+)         
Indonesia         2003(-) 
Japan       1997(+)   
Jordan   2007(-)       
South Korea 1997(+), 2007(+)      2004(+)   
Malaysia   2012(+)       
Morocco   2005(-)       
New Zealand 2008(+)         
Poland   2010(+)  2006(-), 2009(-)  1997(+)   
Romania   2008(+)       
Turkey 2003(+)    2003(-)    2003(+) 
Viet Nam   2007(+)       
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Table I 
Leisure Preference and Tax Planning by Country 
This table summarizes sample distribution by country and reports country mean tax planning and 
leisure preference.  
Country   Period   Obs.   TA   LEISURE 
Argentina  1997~2013  585  0.191  0.797 
Australia  1994~2013  4,453  0.089  0.893 
Brazil  2005~2013  1,583  0.189  0.858 
Canada  1999~2008  3,989  0.131  0.879 
Chile  1997~2013  1,587  0.047  0.875 
China  1997~2013  21,222  0.173  0.579 
Colombia  1997~2013  111  0.189  0.858 
Cyprus  2005~2013  204  -0.142  0.880 
Egypt  2003~2013  350  0.071  0.559 
Finland  1994~2009  626  -0.012  0.921 
Germany  1994~2013  4,704  0.116  0.846 
Hungary  1998~2009  65  0.026  0.826 
India  1997~2013  23,484  0.120  0.602 
Indonesia  1999~2009  1615  -0.026  0.625 
Japan  1993~2013  32,553  -0.040  0.890 
Jordan  2003~2012  165  0.095  0.736 
South Korea  1996~2013  5,111  0.231  0.877 
Malaysia  2005~2013  4,867  0.014  0.864 
Mexico  1993~2013  1,233  0.129  0.824 
Morocco  2004~2011  250  0.233  0.532 
Netherlands  2005~2013  806  0.026  0.940 
New Zealand 1994~2010  542  0.056  0.879 
Nigeria  2003~2013  230  0.055  0.859 
Norway  1994~2009  692  0.065  0.936 
Pakistan  1997~2011  863  0.133  0.507 
Peru  1997~2013  889  -0.095  0.643 
Philippines  1997~2013  817  0.091  0.554 
Poland  1996~2013  2,157  0.033  0.844 
Romania  2005~2013  373  0.007  0.747 
Russian  2005~2013  1,140  -0.149  0.756 
Singapore  1999~2013  2,750  -0.042  0.865 
Slovenia  1998~2013  147  -0.033  0.865 
South Africa  2001~2013  2,299  0.108  0.768 
Spain  1992~2013  1,611  0.111  0.871 
Sweden  1994~2013  2,273  0.042  0.945 
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Table I – Continued 
 
Switzerland  1993~2009  1,275  0.023  0.886 
Thailand  2005~2013  2,808  0.024  0.748 
Turkey  1995~2013  1,397  0.016  0.849 
Ukraine  2005~2013  57  -0.021  0.791 
United States 1994~2013  54,629  0.135  0.892 
Viet Nam  2004~2009  358  0.073  0.490 
        186,870         
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Table II 
Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports descriptive statistics on our main regression variables. Columns (1) - (3) report descriptive statistics 
for the full sample and high and low leisure preference subsamples, respectively. Column (4) compares variables 
between strong and weak leisure preference countries.  
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
    Full Sample   Weak Leisure Preference   Strong Leisure Preference   Difference (Strong - Weak) 
  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median  t value  z value  
TA  0.089 0.118  0.110 0.150  0.068 0.090  -39.77*** -48.59*** 
LEISURE  0.802 0.873  0.707 0.705  0.896 0.891  407.7*** 374.90*** 
ROA  0.080 0.063  0.084 0.067  0.076 0.060  -21.84*** -23.05*** 
SIZE (billion) 67.060 1.564  47.030 1.065  86.920 3.444  33.97*** 77.85*** 
LEV  0.220 0.199  0.223 0.204  0.217 0.194  -7.335*** -10.09*** 
SALEGR  0.170 0.090  0.221 0.133  0.120 0.061  -56.01*** -76.63*** 
MULTI  0.447 0.000  0.479 0.000  0.416 0.000  -27.69*** -27.63*** 
RD  0.011 0.000  0.006 0.000  0.016 0.000  73.48*** 126.50*** 
INTAG  0.071 0.009  0.041 0.002  0.101 0.019  99.40*** 126.60*** 
PPE  0.325 0.289  0.346 0.317  0.303 0.263  -41.80*** -46.45*** 
DA  0.060 0.039  0.072 0.050  0.049 0.032  -74.87*** -79.50*** 
DWC  0.047 0.025  0.059 0.035  0.034 0.018  -30.32*** -32.45*** 
DNCO  0.037 0.018  0.046 0.028  0.028 0.011  -36.75*** -51.56*** 
DFIN  -0.007 0.000  -0.015 -0.004  0.000 0.001  29.21*** 39.79*** 
BTC  0.380 0.429  0.453 0.488  0.308 0.262  -130.70*** -130.00*** 
EARNVOL 0.487 0.488  0.538 0.571  0.436 0.476  -89.96*** -88.68*** 
WW  0.759 1.000  0.831 1.000  0.687 1.000  -73.75*** -72.70*** 
TAXRATE 0.346 0.370  0.321 0.330  0.370 0.393  171.50*** 169.60*** 
TR  0.120 0.106  0.119 0.109  0.120 0.104  3.548*** -48.95*** 
GDP (trillion) 5.216 4.446  3.144 1.471  7.270 5.231  204.20*** 177.50*** 
FINDEV  1.712 1.587  1.118 1.214  2.301 2.263  434.20*** 314.40*** 
LEGAL  7.181 8.000  6.241 7.000  8.114 8.000  230.70*** 197.40*** 
CRP   6.058 7.100   4.614 3.600   7.489 7.500   414.40*** 249.90*** 
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Table III 
Main Results on Leisure Preference and Tax Planning 
This table reports main results on leisure preference and tax planning. Variable definitions are in 
Appendix A. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  
Standard errors are clustered at the country level. T-statistics are in the parentheses.  
  DV = TA 
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
LEISURE -0.912***  -0.904***  -0.348***  -0.338*** 
 (-5.57)  (-5.52)  (-3.27)  (-3.24) 
ROA   0.101    0.105 
   (1.41)    (1.45) 
SIZE   -0.002    -0.001 
   (-0.72)    (-0.37) 
LEV   0.050***    0.052*** 
   (2.75)    (2.92) 
SALEGR   0.021***    0.020*** 
   (3.36)    (3.07) 
MULTI   -0.015*    -0.014** 
   (-1.84)    (-2.10) 
RD   0.282**    0.298** 
   (2.23)    (2.60) 
INTAG   -0.033    -0.043** 
   (-1.44)    (-2.10) 
PPE   0.057***    0.052** 
   (3.09)    (2.68) 
DA   0.021    0.054 
   (0.49)    (1.36) 
DWC   0.053***    0.051*** 
   (5.35)    (7.00) 
DNCO   0.076***    0.086*** 
   (2.76)    (3.48) 
DFIN   0.098***    0.100*** 
   (4.20)    (4.21) 
BTC     0.000  0.009 
     (0.00)  (0.44) 
EARNVOL     0.012  0.020 
      (0.27)  (0.45) 
WW     -0.061***  -0.058*** 
     (-4.08)  (-3.73) 
TAXRATE     0.776***  0.814*** 
     (2.75)  (2.96) 
TR     -0.053  -0.187 
     (-0.06)  (-0.23) 
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Table III – Continued 
 
GDP     -0.168***  -0.165*** 
     (-4.34)  (-4.35) 
FINDEV     0.019  0.017 
     (0.51)  (0.45) 
LEGAL     0.035*  0.035* 
     (1.74)  (1.91) 
CRP     -0.011  -0.013 
     (-0.64)  (-0.72) 
Constant 0.822***  0.785***  4.334***  4.199*** 
 (7.08)  (7.12)  (5.31)  (5.18) 
R2 0.176  0.187  0.200  0.211 
Observation   186,870  186,870  186,870  186,870 
Country FE YES  YES  YES  YES 
Year FE YES  YES  YES  YES 
Industry FE YES  YES  YES  YES 
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Table IV 
Robustness Checks 
This table reports regression results on robustness checks on alternative leisure preference 
measures (Panel A), alternative samples (Panel B), and alternative stories (Panel C). Variable 
definitions are in Appendix A. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. T-statistics are in the parentheses.  
Panel A: Alternative Leisure Preference Measures 
  DV = TA 
 Alternative Leisure Preference Measure 
 (1)   (2) 
 Relative Leisure Preference  Residual Leisure Preference 
LEISURE -0.236***  -0.375*** 
 (-3.15)  (-3.27) 
Constant 4.221***  4.315*** 
 (5.21)  (4.76) 
R2 0.211  0.211 
Observation 186,870  185,852 
Controls YES  YES 
Country FE YES  YES 
Year FE YES  YES 
Industry FE YES   YES 
  
Panel B Alternative samples 
  DV = TA 
 (3)   (4) 
 Country-Year medians  Country-Year-Industry medians 
LEISURE -0.565***  -0.328** 
 (-2.75)  (-2.09) 
Constant 2.407***  1.665** 
 (3.05)  (2.19) 
R2 0.710  0.379 
Observation 503  10,569 
Controls YES  YES 
Country FE YES  YES 
Year FE YES  YES 
Industry FE NO   YES 
 
 
  
52 
 
Table IV – Continued 
 
Panel C: Alternative Stories 
DV = TA 
 (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9) 
 Effort Consuming 
 Activities 
 Competition  Risk Aversion  
Tax Related 
 Beliefs 
 Tax System  
Heterogeneity 
LEISURE -0.336***  -0.338***  -0.449***  -0.380***  -0.338** 
 (-3.20)  (-3.25)  (-2.75)  (-4.72)  (-2.63) 
CAPX -0.022         
 (-0.63)         
ACQ -0.169***         
 (-5.53)         
EISSUE 0.024         
 (0.41)         
DISSUE 0.067**         
 (2.35)         
INDHHI   -0.010       
   (-1.00)       
RISKAVR     -0.214     
     (-1.17)     
TAXCHEAT       0.806**   
       (2.16)   
GOVTRUST       -0.123   
       (-0.81)   
TAXSYS         0.071 
         (0.70) 
Constant 4.194***  4.211***  4.513***  4.258***  4.529*** 
 (5.20)  (5.20)  (2.91)  (5.24)  (2.96) 
R2 0.211  0.211  0.201  0.214  0.200 
Observation 186,870  186,870  115,391  183,220  115,620 
Controls YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Country FE YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Year FE YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Industry FE YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
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Table V 
Evidence from Work Time Reforms 
This table reports difference-in-differences regression results using work time reforms as repeated 
shocks. The dependent variable is the current change in tax planning. Two indicator variables, 
WTR+ and WTR-, denote work time reforms that advance and reduce leisure time of year t-1, 
respectively. Other independent variables are lagged changes in control variables.  *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Standard errors are clustered at the 
country level. T-statistics are in the parentheses.  
  DV = Change in TA 
WTR+ -0.014** 
 (-2.10) 
WTR- -0.003 
 (-0.39) 
Lagged change in … 
ROA -0.255*** 
 (-6.48) 
SIZE -0.073*** 
 (-4.71) 
LEV 0.073** 
 (2.46) 
SALEGR 0.004 
 (1.44) 
MULTI -0.000 
 (-0.24) 
RD 0.184* 
 (1.88) 
INTAG -0.007 
 (-0.45) 
PPE -0.035*** 
 (-3.30) 
DA 0.078*** 
 (4.22) 
DWC 0.008 
 (1.28) 
DNCO 0.011* 
  (1.93) 
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Table V - Continued 
 
DFIN 0.012 
 (1.38) 
BTC -0.020 
 (-0.78) 
EARNVOL -0.010 
 (-0.23) 
WW -0.020*** 
 (-3.26) 
TAXRATE 0.036 
 (0.15) 
TR 0.726 
 (1.23) 
GDP -0.133* 
 (-1.80) 
FINDEV -0.016 
 (-0.65) 
LEGAL 0.023* 
 (1.72) 
CRP 0.004 
 (0.27) 
Constant -0.031** 
 (-2.13) 
R2 0.054 
Observation 134,663 
Industry-Year FE         YES 
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Table VI 
Economic Mechanism 
This table tests for the economic mechanism behind the association between leisure preference 
and tax planning. Column (1) interacts leisure preference with tax complexity (TAXCOMP). 
Column (2) interacts leisure preference with tax consulting (TAXCONSULT). *, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Standard errors are clustered at the country 
level. T-statistics are in the parentheses.  
  DV = TA 
 (1)   (2) 
LEISURE 2.015*  -1.362*** 
 (1.72)  (-4.01) 
LEISURE * TAXCOMP  -0.388**   
 (-2.04)   
LEISURE * TAXCONSULT   0.592*** 
   (3.22) 
ROA 0.106  0.105 
 (1.45)  (1.41) 
SIZE -0.001  -0.001 
 (-0.33)  (-0.39) 
LEV 0.051***  0.051*** 
 (2.87)  (2.90) 
SALEGR 0.020***  0.020*** 
 (3.07)  (2.98) 
MULTI -0.013**  -0.014** 
 (-2.07)  (-2.13) 
RD 0.297**  0.302** 
 (2.58)  (2.66) 
INTAG -0.042**  -0.042* 
 (-2.07)  (-2.03) 
PPE 0.052**  0.052** 
 (2.70)  (2.67) 
DA 0.054  0.058 
 (1.35)  (1.44) 
DWC 0.051***  0.050*** 
 (6.96)  (6.80) 
DNCO 0.085***  0.085*** 
 (3.44)  (3.36) 
DFIN 0.100***  0.100*** 
  (4.21)   (4.13) 
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Table VI – Continued 
 
BTC 0.007   0.002 
 (0.33)  (0.08) 
EARNVOL 0.026  0.034 
 (0.75)  (0.70) 
WW -0.059***  -0.056*** 
 (-4.17)  (-3.55) 
TAXRATE 0.804***  0.774*** 
 (3.05)  (2.83) 
TR -0.286  -0.142 
 (-0.35)  (-0.17) 
GDP -0.161***  -0.168*** 
 (-4.19)  (-4.25) 
FINDEV 0.017  0.019 
 (0.48)  (0.50) 
LEGAL 0.038**  0.031 
 (2.31)  (1.63) 
CRP -0.012  -0.011 
 (-0.72)  (-0.60) 
Constant 4.101***  4.330*** 
 (5.01)  (5.09) 
R2 0.211  0.213 
Observation     186,870     184,435 
Country FE      YES       YES 
Year FE      YES       YES 
Industry FE      YES        YES 
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Table VII 
Leisure Preference and Firm Value 
This table reports results on leisure preference and firm value. The dependent variable is firm value 
measured as Tobin’s Q. Columns (1) – (4) add different sets of control variables. Variable 
definitions are in Appendix A. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. T-statistics are in the parentheses.  
  DV = TOBINQ 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
LEISURE -0.506**  -0.550**  -1.022*  -1.244*** 
 (-2.09)  (-2.10)  (-1.95)  (-3.16) 
ROA   4.390***    4.335*** 
   (19.68)    (17.68) 
SIZE   -0.025    -0.031 
   (-0.88)    (-1.00) 
LEV   0.362***    0.357*** 
   (3.94)    (4.02) 
RD   6.619***    6.681*** 
   (4.20)    (4.33) 
INTAG   -0.152    -0.144 
   (-1.12)    (-1.05) 
PPE   -0.277***    -0.280*** 
   (-4.28)    (-4.44) 
DA   0.744***    0.733*** 
   (5.23)    (4.91) 
DWC   0.175*    0.187* 
   (1.88)    (2.00) 
DNCO   0.126    0.134 
   (1.00)    (1.07) 
DFIN   0.432***    0.433*** 
   (4.04)    (4.09) 
CAPX   0.771**    0.850*** 
   (2.58)    (3.04) 
INTEREST   0.078**    0.066* 
   (2.39)    (1.94) 
DIVD   4.890***    5.226*** 
      (4.34)       (5.55) 
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Table VII - Continued 
 
AGE     -0.059       -0.055 
   (-1.14)    (-0.96) 
BTC     -0.386***  -0.190 
     (-3.25)  (-1.51) 
EARNVOL     -0.191  -0.193 
     (-0.60)  (-0.57) 
WW     0.052  0.083 
     (0.83)  (1.28) 
TAXRATE     0.356  1.289** 
     (0.57)  (2.12) 
TR     3.682  2.016 
     (1.45)  (0.73) 
GDP     -0.048  0.020 
     (-0.40)  (0.16) 
FINDEV     -0.129  -0.132 
     (-0.96)  (-1.07) 
LEGAL     0.079  0.129* 
     (0.82)  (1.71) 
CRP     -0.081**  -0.088** 
     (-2.23)  (-2.52) 
Constant 1.761***  1.698***  2.748  0.540 
 (8.37)  (5.43)  (0.83)  (0.15) 
R2 0.165  0.308  0.169  0.313 
Observation 151,584  151,584  151,584  151,584 
Country FE YES  YES  YES  YES 
Year FE YES  YES  YES  YES 
Industry FE YES   YES   YES   YES 
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Table VIII 
Path Analysis 
This table performs path analysis using Sobel test. The direct path is from leisure preference 
(LEISURE) to firm value (TOBINQ). The indirect path is from leisure preference to tax planning 
(TA) and, further, from tax planning (TA) to firm value (TOBINQ). 
Direct Path   
      p(LEISURE, TOBINQ) -1.178*** 
Mediated Path for TA  
      p(LEISURE, TA) -0.390*** 
      p(TA, TOBINQ) 0.169*** 
Total Mediated Path for TA -0.066*** 
Proportion of Mediated Effect to Total Effect 0.053 
Controls YES 
Observation 151,584 
Country FE YES 
Year FE YES 
Industry FE YES 
 
 
